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In 1686 the leadership of Massachusetts was involved in the first operational bank 
scheme in America. In 1688 this note-issuing bank was mysteriously aborted at an 
advanced stage. It was a unique opportunity for financial development that did not arise 
again for decades. I suggest a new, simple explanation of the bank’s demise: The bank’s 
notes were supposed to be backed mostly by private land in Massachusetts, but the new 
royal governor invalidated all the land titles. As in contemporary England, absolutism’s 
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After showing him an Indian deed for land, he said that their hand was no more worth than a 
scratch with a bear’s paw, undervaluing all my titles, though everyway legal under our former 





The relation between the form of government and economic development is one of the 
most important topics in economics. Consider the specific issue of how an absolutist 
government might affect investment. On the one hand it is argued that absolutism 
discourages investment because of its disrespect for property rights (North and Weingast, 
1989). On the other hand it is argued that some investments might take place only by an 
absolutist leader who can expropriate all the profits (e.g., Greif, 1994).  
  Perhaps the last place on Earth where one would expect to find either of these two 
effects of absolutism is Massachusetts. I show that both effects did exist there in the 
1680s under the royal Dominion of New England. Moreover, both effects operated – 
back to back – on the same financial institution, known as John Blackwell’s bank. This 
“private” bank scheme rose dramatically thanks to a new absolutist government whose 
leaders also led the bank. The appointment of a new head to that government completely 
reversed the bank’s fortunes. It was doomed not for passive lack of support from the new 
governor, but for the same reason that bank schemes repeatedly failed to materialize in 
England. The Stuart-appointed governor showed the same infamous Stuart disrespect for 
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property rights by invalidating all the land titles in Massachusetts – the same land titles 
that were supposed to back the bank’s notes. 
  While the bank’s rise has been accurately linked to the personal involvement of the 
government leaders in the bank (Lewis, 1967), the possibility that the invalidation of land 
titles killed that land bank has never been raised. The timeline supports this hypothesis. 
The governor had informed the colonists for more than a year that their titles were 
defective. He was formally passive, acted behind the scenes, and patiently tried to 
educate them. During that time the bank scheme continued in its progress. The bank was 
aborted four days after the governor suddenly switched to active criminal prosecution of 
land owners who did not fix their titles to his liking. 
  One contribution of this paper is a solution to one of the oldest puzzles of American 
banking, one that has intrigued most scholars of the early American economy. A broader 
contribution is to the debate regarding absolutism and economic activity. The adverse 
effect of Stuart absolutism on financial development, famously shown in North and 
Weingast (1989), has been challenged by claims that things were not that bad before the 
Glorious Revolution, or not that good after it
2. I show that a bank which grew under 
different circumstances from those of Stuart England collapsed as soon as the 
circumstances became too similar to those of Stuart England.  
  I start with background on the problems of English banking under the Stuarts (Section 
2) and on the Massachusetts economy in the 1680s (Section 3). I then discuss the rise of 
the bank (Section 4), the new land policy (Section 5), and the bank’s fall (Section 6). 
Using the facts presented in Sections 3-6, I show in Section 7 why existing explanations 
of the bank’s demise are incomplete at best. Section 8 concludes. 
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2. Absolutism and Banking in England 
In the seventeenth century, as continental Europeans deposited their specie in public 
banks, the English people were busy hiding their money from their government. The 
Stuarts raised revenue without Parliament’s approval and thus undermined property 
rights. They used forced loans whose terms were not honored, taxes according to ancient 
prerogative rights, and sale of monopoly rights which ruined competitors’ investments. 
Most importantly, Charles I confiscated ₤100,000 of merchants’ deposits from the 
Tower of London. The merchants started keeping their specie at home and later deposited 
it with goldsmiths
3. In the following decades, leading bank promoters, political theorists, 
merchants, and political advisors, told Cromwell and later Charles II that rich men would 
not join a bank because it would be unsafe under a monarch: The traumatic Tower 
confiscation “sticks in the memory of most merchants ... the thing will never be forgot.”
4 
Deposits with goldsmiths did not protect the merchants either. Repayment of their huge 
loans to the king were suspended in the infamous Stop of the Exchequer (1672) – the 
“greatest invasion of property.” Leading goldsmiths and many customers went bankrupt. 
Much of the million pound debt was not returned for decades
5.  
Only after installing a Dutch prince and Parliamentary rule in the Glorious Revolution, 
large joint-stock banks finally had a chance to replace the simple goldsmith-banker. The 
Bank of England was made private partly in order to disassociate it with the king. The 
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Bank’s existence was also a guarantee against a Stuart comeback: Which depositor would 
support another tyrant who would inevitably confiscate the Bank’s money one day
6? 
3. The Massachusetts Economy 
In 1675 the thriving Massachusetts economy began to crumble
7. King Philip’s War with 
neighboring Natives resulted in large losses in capital and labor force, put the colony in 
debt, and eliminated fur trade. The king attacked the colony’s charter, and the countering 
lobbying effort drained the treasury. The colony was forced to enforce the mercantile 
Navigation Acts and honor the royal prerogative (i.e., close its mint). Peace with Holland 
ended privateering as a source of specie. Thus, the specie supply hit an all-time low
8. 
There were only two financial institutions: The Corporation for the Propagation of the 
Gospel in New England was a missionary company whose spare (English) funds were 
loaned to New England individuals
9; a private clearinghouse operated from 1681-1683.
10 
  The only promising sector was real estate
11. Natives’ last enclaves in New England 
were gone, leading to land speculation: Obtaining cheap titles to large tracts of 
unimproved land, in the hope of selling them when colonial expansion would raise the 
land’s value. Ignoring the religious objection to speculative gains, leading colonists 
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devoted their time to accumulating real estate and showing off
12. Recent non-Puritan 
immigrants joined the trend. The speculators had a legal problem, due to conflicting titles 
given by the ancient Council of New England, the Crown, colonial governments and 
towns, and Natives. The speculators needed to control the governments and courts in 
order to win their cases, but the non-Puritans were ineligible for office. Inter-colonial 
border disputes necessitated control of the entire area.  
  The royal attack on the Massachusetts charter was a golden opportunity. Chief 
speculator, Anglican Richard Wharton, orchestrated the dismantling of the charter regime 
and the creation of a consolidated Dominion of New England. His success turned land 
speculation into a gold rush, involving much of the local elite. They hoped that a royal 
governor would confirm their titles or at least let them control local courts. Earlier 
constitutional changes in England did result in massive changes in land ownership
13.  
  Land rights were a bargaining chip in the battle of the charter. The colony’s English 
nemesis, Edward Randolph, claimed that by violating the charter the colonists had lost 
right to both land and government. He then repeatedly recommended the king to promise 
protection of property rights under the new regime
14. The king did make a general 
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promise in 1683, but the colonists were still agitated about it as late as 1686.
15 Observing 
the abuses to land titles committed in proprietary New Hampshire
16, Massachusetts 
confirmed the titles that it and the towns had given, effectively sealing them ex-post. 
Towns and individuals also obtained from Natives back-up deeds or testimonies about 
old deeds. The General Court’s very last act before expiring in 1686 was to secure papers 
“such as refer to our title of our land, by purchase of Indians or otherwise.”
17  
4. The Rise of the Bank 
In 1684 Englishman Captain John Blackwell fled religious persecution and settled in 
Boston
18. He was an expert on land, specializing in its trade, management and appraisal. 
Since he was Cromwell’s Treasurer of Army and son-in-law of a Cromwellian colonel, 
he was popular in Massachusetts. He was granted land and was almost elected to office. 
He brought a bank scheme that he and others tried in England
19, but put it on hold until 
the political uncertainty cleared. Until May 1686 it was unclear what regime would 
replace the charter
20. Blackwell befriended the local elite, joining two speculative land 
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ventures led by Joseph Dudley and William Stoughton
21. These former magistrates were 
expected to lead the new regime due to their active or passive contribution to the end of 
charter rule
22.  
  In May 1686 the Dominion of New England was established
23. Its Council had all the 
legislative, executive, and judicial authority. The Councilors were of the local elite, with 
Dudley serving as President until the arrival of a Governor, and Stoughton serving as 
Deputy-President and Chief Judge
24. The local Council headed by a late governor’s son 
was supposed to ease on the anxious Puritans the transition from autonomy to royal 
submission
25. According to Lewis (1967, 1974), most of the Councilors joined the 
absolutist regime only to influence their titles. 
  In June the Council formed a grand and standing committee of merchants, chaired by 
Blackwell, to try to end the recession
26. In July Blackwell proposed his bank scheme to 
the Council, which referred it to Blackwell’s own committee. Shortly thereafter it was 
known that Sir Edmund Andros would be Governor. Massachusetts and especially 
Connecticut had border disputes and other conflicts with him when he governed New 
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York (1674-1680)
27, but this had been long ago. For all they knew
28 they had no special 
reason to fear him. The local elite continued its land speculation
29. In September the 
Council approved the committee’s positive report on the bank, and made its prospective 
banknotes legal tender for all payments
30. Later, in 1687, the bank’s directors would be 
revealed as Blackwell, Dudley, Stoughton, and Councilor Wait Winthrop (another major 
land speculator). All the other bank officers were also large landowners. Two of them 
were also senior members in Blackwell’s committee
31. Perhaps the bank was approved in 
1686 because the government leaders had already had a stake in it, or the approval was 
implicitly conditional on the appointment of government leaders to key bank positions. 
Either way, as Lewis (1967, pp. 191-2) noted, there were symbiotic relations between the 
absolutist government, the advising committee, and the “private” bank. 
  The bank was supposed to issue notes to relieve the lack of specie
32. People would get 
a loan of banknotes in return for mortgaged assets. The bank’s partners and others were 
supposed to agree voluntarily to accept the notes in trade. Convertibility of notes into 
land was only implicit: Defaulting borrowers would have lost their mortgaged assets; 
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then proceeds of the assets’ sale would be available for note redemption. The bank was 
first and foremost based on land, with goods being secondary. The prospectuses mention 
“lands of good title mortgaged; and staple un-perishable goods & merchandizes 
deposited.” They give three examples of how banknotes may start circulating: First, a 
land-owner mortgaging his land; second, a mine-owner mortgaging his mine and later 
also depositing the mine’s produce; and third, a producer of manufactures mortgaging his 
workshop or his produce
33. The attractiveness of land over goods was obvious. Land is 
durable and hard to steal and titles are easy to store. In America in particular land was 
more abundant than anything else
34. It was recognized that only after landowners got 
currency they could hire labor and buy tools and start production on their land. Only later 
they could deposit goods in the bank instead of land.  
  If it were truly private, the bank could earn money only from interest on loans, limited 
by usury laws and competition. However, with its leaders also leading the absolutist 
government, the expected profit was much higher. The government could make more 
land mortgagable by resolving legal disputes and by customarily granting public land to 
its leaders. It could disallow competing banks and the reopening of the mint
35. The legal 
tender status – highly unusual for private notes – would help them circulate as currency. 
As in Grief (1994), a particular project was more likely to succeed if led by an absolutist 
government, and it was actually good for the economy.  
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5. The Andros Land Policy 
In December 1686 Andros arrived. His commission left the Council intact and Dudley 
became his deputy. Dudley and Stoughton headed the superior court
36. Andros was 
ordered to demand quitrents for all grants of land “yet undisposed of.” While marriages 
performed according to local, rather than English, law, got a blanket confirmation in the 
commission, land contracts did not enjoy such protection. Quite the contrary, Andros’s 
secret instructions mentioned that some land titles needed his confirmation
37. He ruled 
that all land titles needed his confirmation, and were completely invalid otherwise. 
5.1. Unimproved Land 
The speculators hoped that Andros would confirm their inter-colonial titles. In February 
1687 he frustrated the Atherton company’s claims by referring the matter to England and 
prohibiting the speculators from abusing their control of local courts. Later he 
recommended England not to recognize the speculators’ claims. Councilor Wharton, an 
Atherton leader, also claimed another territory. Andros recommended against this one as 
well
38, so Wharton sailed to England to lobby for Andros’s removal
39. Wharton was 
related by both marriage and business to both Dudley and the Winthrop brothers Wait 
and Fitz-John, who were also councilors and Atherton shareholders. Fitz-John was 
Andros’s old friend and appointee as military commander
40. They were surprised by 
Andros’s policy. Andros was also instructed to make a recommendation on another 
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38 Toppan (1899b), p. 253, PRO CO 1/63 #21iv-v, CO 5/904, p. 292, Lewis (1974), pp. 264-7. 
39 Lewis (1967), p. 267, Sewall, pp. 182. 
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speculative venture, involving Wharton, Dudley, Stoughton, several other councilors, and 
Blackwell as a senior partner. They chose not to pursue it as long as Andros was in 
power
41. In 1687 Dudley and Stoughton did get a confirmation of another title they held 
with Blackwell, while apparently hiding his involvement from Andros
42. 
5.2. Improved Land 
In early 1687 Andros started telling people that even titles to local, improved land were 
defective according to English law. Every landowner was required to ask for a warrant to 
survey the land he claimed as his, and later apply for a confirmation that the land 
belonged to him. Andros had several arguments: First, the land originally belonged to the 
Crown because it was claimed for him in the 1490s by explorer Sebastian Cabot; second, 
“wherever an Englishman sets his foot all that he has is the king’s;” third, Native deeds 
were worthless (see the opening quote of this paper); fourth, although the Crown gave the 
land to the colony, the land reverted to him once the charter was revoked: “The calf died 
in the cow’s belly.” There were also techincal defects: The General Court did not use its 
seal in its grants; and grants from towns to individuals were invalid because these so-
called towns were not incorporated
43.  
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  Andros did not put his comprehensive anti-land policy into law and made no public 
announcement
44. He spread rumors about it and encouraged loyal supporters to lead the 
colonists by example and apply for confirmation of their improved land. In June 1687 he 
signed his first survey warrant, to the benefit of Simon Lynde. Lynde was an Atherton 
partner, a bank officer, and Andros’s nominee to fill a Council vacancy
45. Dudley 
followed with applying for surveys of lands he held alone or with Stoughton
46. More than 
a hundred surveys were ordered by July 1688, some of which were for other councilors 
and their relatives. Most were followed by applications to confirm titles
47.   
5.3. Common Land 
The towns kept some of their land in common, i.e., they could be used by all residents for 
pasture. Andros did not recognize common lands: Since they did not belong to any 
individual or corporation, they were up for grabs. He incited his cronies to apply for such 
lands, resulting in a beggar-thy-neighbors gold rush. The colonists organized legal 
defense in town meetings so he outlawed meetings and imposed high legal fees
48.  
 
                                                 
44 His commission ordered him to send Council decisions to England and maybe he wanted to avoid that. 
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45 Tuttle (1919), p. 294, MA 2:137, 126:357, 360, 127:69, PRO CO 5/904, p. 347. 
46 Tuttle, pp. 298, 313-4, Toppan (1900), pp. 487-8, PRO CO 5/904, p. 347. 
47 Tuttle, passim. 
48 Tuttle, pp. 296-9, 335-7, Toppan (1900), pp. 491-2, Whitmore I, pp. 50, 99-101, 141, 143, Sewall, pp. 
199, 206, Hall , Leder, and Kammen (1964), pp. 56-7, MA 127:172-8, 128 passim, Trumbull and Hoadly, 
vol. III, pp. 427-9, Barnes, pp. 195-8, Lewis, pp. 258-9.   14
5.4. Holy Land 
Andros invaded a church and forced the Puritans to share it with the few Anglicans. He 
threatened to seize all other churches
49 and later pressured colonists to sell land to the 
government for building an Anglican church
50. He ordered the Anglican minister to 
participate in Harvard’s commencement, thus lending credibility to a factually-based 
rumor that the Puritan college might be turned into an Anglican one
51.  
5.5. Robert Mason’s Claims 
Councilor Robert Mason was the New Hampshire proprietor and he also claimed 
Massachusetts’ Essex County. Andros enforced an old ruling on a New Hampshire land 
case in his favor and made his men militia officers in Essex. A tax revolt erupted there 
shortly thereafter, perhaps reflecting fear for Essex titles. The emboldened Mason then 
sued more New Hampshire landowners, some of whom lived in Massachusetts
52. 
5.6. The Colonists’ General Response 
Andros’s total attack left the colonists in disbelief. Based on English precedents they did 
consider Natives to be humans capable of selling land
53. Their possession and 
improvement of the land for half a century should have been sufficient to overcome 
                                                 
49 Sewall, pp. 162, 171, Whitmore (1869), vol. II, p. 45, Toppan (1899b), p. 264, Lewis, pp. 216-7. 
50 Sewall, pp. 207, 210. 
51 Governor Cranfield of New Hampshire proposed it. Sewall, p. 181, PRO CO 1/65 #52i, 1/52 #19.  
52 Toppan (1900), p. 473, Lewis, pp. 228-9, Sewall, p. 187. 
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technical defects, but Andros – following a clear Stuart precedent – disagreed
54. Their ex-
post sealing of grants was ignored by Andros since this was done after the charter was 
revoked and the General Court no longer existed legally. They tried in vain to get the 
technical defects fixed in a blanket royal confirmation (as would be done in 1691)
55. The 
king’s recent Declaration of Indulgence did promise safety of property, but Andros 
seemed to have interpreted it as protecting only valid titles. 
  The land policy reduced land value in three ways. First, any unconfirmed plot could 
have been grabbed by another. Second, the legal fees were very high and landowners had 
to pay a separate fee per county
56. Third, Andros’s commission ordered him to charge an 
infinite stream of quitrents on land undisposed of, and his policy implied that all 
unconfirmed land was legally undisposed of
57.  
  Fearing for the common lands, the churches, and Harvard, the Puritan ministers 
decided to ask the king for freedom of religion and safety of property. The messenger 
was Harvard President Increase Mather. Just before leaving for England, Andros arrested 
him on bogus charges, combining the Staurt tradition of using the legal system to 
persecute the opposition with the tactic of New Hampshire’s tyrant of blocking the 
                                                 
54 Hutchinson (1936 [1765]), vol. I, p. 305, Whitmore I, pp. 95-6. This is how Charles I treated long-time 
invaders to the royal forests (Gregg, 1984, pp. 224-6). 
55 Whitmore I, pp. 143-4. 
56 Whitmore I, pp. 92, 98-100, 143, 205. 
57 PRO CO 5/904, p. 279, Whitmore I, p. 143. His secret instructions distinguished undisposed land from 
unconfirmed land (CO 5/904, p. 288) but the colonists did not know that (MHSC [1892], p. 18). He was 
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opposition’s access to England
58. A week later, bank officer John Saffin wrote to 
Plymouth’s late governor about the land problems. The entire letter is written in code out 
of fear that it would be intercepted by Andros
59. Andros even tried to enact restrictions on 
anyone’s freedom to leave for England
60. Mather was exonerated and quickly escaped to 
England under the noses of officials who tried to re-arrest him
61.  
5.7. The Bank Continues 
The land policy was gradually revealed between February and July 1687. From then until 
the middle of 1688 they resulted in many petitions, warrants, and lawsuits. Formally, 
Andros only ruled on cases brought before him. Behind the scenes he induced 
applications and a run on the common lands. He even dropped by people’s homes to 
teach them about his policy. Perhaps this tactic was meant to prevent a revolution
62. 
Indeed, the colonists did not understand the crisis quickly. Diarist Samuel Sewall 
reported on the arrival and publication of the Declaration of Indulgence in May and 
August 1687, respectively. He did not mention the Declaration’s guarantee of safety of 
property
63, but in October 1687 both Plymouth and Mather utilized it when petitioning 
the king
64. As late as April 1688 Sewall casually took possession of land he had bought, 
                                                 
58 Sewall, pp. 197-8, Mather (1723), pp. 102-6, North and Weingast, p. 816, Lewis, pp. 116-7, 128. 
59 MHSC (1861), pp. 187-9. 
60 Whitmore I, pp. 141-2. 
61 Sewall, p. 209, Mather (1723), pp. 106-8.  
62 Barnes (p. 188). On tactics see Whitmore I, pp. 87-91, MA 35:186. On colonial anxiety before and after 
Andros’s arrival see Goodrick (1909), vol. VI, p. 206, and MHSC (1861), p. 177, respectively. 
63 Sewall, pp. 177, 186, MHSC (1886), pp. 51-2. 
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with no special concerns or precautions
65. The colonists were perhaps deluded about their 
control over the legal system and London decisions. At home, Dudley was Chief Judge 
and heard appeals. In October 1687 the colonists learned that the local Sir William Phips 
was to be the Dominion’s Provost Marshal (chief law enforcer)
66. They eagerly awaited 
his arrival from England. They also thought that Wharton, the Dominion’s mastermind, 
was powerful enough to reverse the land policy. In 1688 the Lords of Trade 
recommended the king to rule in his favor so he sent optimistic letters home
67.  
  Andros’s gradual tactic and the colonists’ delusions help explaining why the bank was 
kept alive. The ruling on speculative lands was disappointing but not new (the Atherton 
scheme had been on hold since 1659). The attacked Harvard and the church were not 
mortgageable anyway. The attack on the common lands could actually turn public, non-
mortgageable land into private, mortgageable one, and that was good for the bank. Even 
in late 1687, mostly cronies applied to confirm land titles, with little or no fees. No steps 
were taken yet against those who did not apply
68.  
  The bank scheme moved forward
69. In April 1687 the bank’s constitution was 
adopted. In June the bank’s rules were set and in September former magistrate Elisha 
Cooke became an officer. On December 2
nd there was a meeting. Davis, the leading 
scholar of Massachusetts banking, thinks they tried to make Andros a partner
70. On that 
                                                 
65 Sewall, p. 208. 
66 Sewall, p. 192. 
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68 Tuttle, pp. 292, 294-313.  
69 The documents mentioned below are in MA 127:66-69, 129:55-62, Davis (1910), vol. I, pp. 123-183. 
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day, bank officer Elisha Hutchinson sailed to London to join Wharton. He was also a 
senior Atherton partner and Andros had ignored his two requests to confirm his land. He 
saw where this was heading, having lost his Maine land to the same kind of policy a year 
earlier
71. The last exactly dated sign of life from the bank is a document dated January 
5
th, 1688. Blackwell wrote a prospectus sometime in 1687 and a very similar one was 
published in London sometime in 1688. 
6. The Showdown and the Bank’s End 
In April 1688 news had arrived that James II was expecting a baby. The chance for a 
future Catholic son and heir was seen as such a fundamental increase in James’s grip on 
power, that its realization triggered the Glorious Revolution. It indirectly strengthened the 
James-appointed Andros as well. Andros ordered a Thanksgiving for the pregnancy but 
the Puritans barely obeyed
72. By June 20
th, 1688, it was known that a new commission 
for Andros was on its way. At the very least, it became common knowledge that New 
York would be added to the Dominion
73. This was an implicit approval of Andros's reign 
and a hint that the London lobbyists failed. He could now apply his land policy to more 
territories. Andros had to be emboldened by these developments, and apparently he 
decided to take the land war to a new level.  
  On June 20
th Stoughton suddenly applied for the first time to survey lands he held 
without Dudley
74. Perhaps he was warned of what was about to come. Two days later 
                                                 
71 MA 126:342a, 127:18a, 69, 100:389, Sewall, p. 196. In Maine, which belonged to New York, he lost his 
land to John West, who would soon be the architect of Andros's land policy (Thayer [1890], p. 285). 
72 Trumbull and Hoadly, vol. III, p. 443, Sewall, p. 211.  
73 Trumbull and Hoadly, vol. III, p. 446. 
74 MA 128:272.   19
Andros decided that Anglicans would always use the forcibly-shared church before the 
Puritans. That day and the next one, a heated debate erupted between him and the church 
leaders. Andros cursed and lost his temper like never before
75. On June 25
th Dudley ruled 
on a land case based on an old Native deed
76, in spite of Andros’s dismissal of such 
deeds. Sometime between July 1
st and 4
th, bank director Wait Winthrop testifies on the 
general anxiety over land, but also tells that he is “very desirous” to see certain ships 
coming from England because Wharton’s letters “give me great hope of a general 
confirmation from his Majsety of all lands according to former usage
77.” On July 5
th the 
ship he mostly expected did arrive, but with Andros’s new commission. Although it was 
not formally published yet, at least the local elite immediately knew the main points: 
Andros got New York and the Jerseys, Dudley was ousted as Andros’s deputy and Chief 
Judge, the land policy was not rebuked, and the articles concerning land did not change
78. 
The next day warrants were issued to survey ten pieces of Councilor Samuel Shrimpton’s 
property. It was his first ever move to get his titles confirmed
79. He may have saw what 
was coming. On July 10
th someone mentioned a letter, related to Blackwell, which hinted 
of a possible blanket confirmation of titles
80. 
6.1. Sewall’s Troubles 
                                                 
75 Sewall, pp. 217-9. 
76 MA 128:291-2. In May a Connecticut judge did the same (Trumbull and Hoadly, vol. III, pp. 444-5). 
77 MHSC (1882), p. 484. Wharton’s letters are in MHSC (1892), pp. 9-17. 
78 Sewall, p. 219, MHSC (1868), p. 671, PRO CO 5/904, pp. 381-404.  
79 Tuttle, pp. 352-3. 
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The colonists had procrastinated for a year on petitions to title confirmations. The high 
fees were a good excuse, but the colonists also hoped that the three lobbyists in London 
would succeed in removing Andros or his land policy. Andros did not want to lose by 
attrition, as Mason did
81, so on July 12
th, 1688, he issued five writs of intrusion
82. These 
rarely used writs stated that their recipients had illegally possessed the king’s land, and 
they had to respond to the accusation in court
83.  
  Writs were issued to Sewall, Joseph Lynde, Shrimpton, and James Russell
84. They 
were among the richest landholders and had land disputes with Andros. Sewall had 
recently represented the invaded Puritan church and refused to sell his land for an 
Anglican church
85. Joseph Lynde (unrelated to Simon Lynde) had earlier applied for all 
his lands together but withdrew when asked to pay a separate fee for each county he had 
land in
86. Shrimpton and Russell were senior members of Blackwell’s inactive trade 
committee and officers in his bank. Whereas Russell had been treasurer of the late charter 
government, Shrimpton was a bitter enemy of that government and the Anglicans’ best 
Puritan friend in Boston. Russell had fought Andros over his own land, which had been 
part of the Charleston commons until 1685. Shrimpton, the richest man in Boston, did 
apply to confirm many other titles shortly beforehand
87. Sewall, Russell, and Shrimpton 
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had been nominated by Dudley in 1686 as substitute councilors. Andros renominated 
Russell and Shrimpton, and Shrimpton’s nomination was approved and materialized in 
early 1688.
88 As Dunn (1960, p. 250) argues, they were chosen as a representative sample 
of the elite. While Andros did not forgive troublemakers, he did not play favors either. 
His attorney-general said that all the rich would be targeted for all their lands
89. Targeting 
those who could afford to pay fees was another Stuart tradition
90.  
  This development shocked the colonists. One wrote “Some in power have said that it 
is not for the King’s Interest that this People should enjoy it [the land], & if another 
People had it would be more for the King’s Interest than now
91.” Diarist Sewall was a 
very cool-headed businessman, but he panicked like never before once he was labeled 
one of “violent intruders into the King’s Possession.” The next day he rushed to the land 
mentioned in his writ, not knowing how to deal with this “unexpected Assault.” The 
following day he sent letters “under covert” to the lobbyists in London – Wharton, 
Mather, and Hutchinson – in that order. This order reflected experience in lobbying, and 
was the exact inverse of his personal relationship with them. Sewall ordered an English 
relative to give them ₤50 for trying to save his lands. While he was receiving conflicting 
advices from friends regarding the writ, Andros’s new commission was formally 
published on July 19
th, clarifying to the colonists how much stronger he had become. 
With much reluctance, Sewall began the confirmation process on July 24
th. Lynde and 
Russell did the same, while Shrimpton prefered a trial. Sewall then reported it in another 
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letter to Mather, indicating that he would have joined them in England if not for his 
wife’s pregnancy. A week later he wrote another letter to Wharton and Mather, raising 
his monetary aid to ₤100. He offered Mather even more money in October, and 
eventually sailed to England in November.
92 There he wrote to a Member of Parliament: 
Since the vacating of the Charter, and erecting a Government by Commission, the Title we have 
to our Lands has been greatly defamed and undervalued: which has been greatly prejudicial to 
the Inhabitants, because their Lands, which were formerly the best part of their Estate, became of 
very little value, and consequently the Owners of very little Credit
93. 
  Some colonists did not wait so long before petitioning for a confirmation of their titles, 
even if they were not served a writ of intrusion. Figure 1 shows the number of original 
survey petitions per day in the Dominion, from January 1
st, 1687, to August 31
st, 1688. I 
did not include the cronies’ predatory petitions and petitions that merely responded to 
challenges by others. The overall number is small because petitioners faced adverse 
social reaction, especially in Massachusetts. The tallest bar in Figure 1 is July 16
th, 1688, 
four days after the writs were served. This is another piece of evidence, independent of 
Sewall’s affairs, as to how the writs shocked the colonists. 
6.2. The Bank’s End 
The bank mostly relied on “good ... unquestionable” titles to lands
94. Sewall was not a 
bank officer. His testimony that land value decreased and could not be used as a source of 
credit is significant evidence in the search for the reason of that land bank’s fall. The 
writs of intrusion – Andros’s first direct and formal attack on land titles – were issued on 
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July 12
th, 1688. Four days later, on July 16
th, Blackwell aborted the bank. In a letter to 
the partners he writes that he understands they no longer wish to be associated with the 
bank. He asks for the plates they used for printing banknotes, and also for 
reimbursements of his costs in publishing the prospectuses. Blackwell’s liquidation letter 
implies that actual operations have never begun. Formal cancelling of all “Covenants and 
Articles” occurred at Blackwell’s house on August 10
th, 1688.
95  
  The writs finally made it loud and clear: All titles in Massachusetts were worthless, 
unless confirmed by Andros at exorbitant fees. Perhaps the bank officers stormed into 
Blackwell’s house on July 12
th and told him they were done with the bank. More likely, 
during the first half of 1688 land litigation increased and hopes for the lobbyists’ success 
diminished; in response the bank had slowly decayed, and perhaps some partners had 
given up; Blackwell kept his hopes up but on July 12
th he understood the game was over. 
  In addition to Dudley losing his senior judicial position, the colonists realized in July 
1688 that law enforcement was also not under their control. Phips arrived in June 1688, 
but although he was sworn in as Provost Marshal on July 6
th, he mysteriously departed to 
England on July 16
th, perhaps fearing assassination
96. As for the lobbyists in London, 
they still had not sent any notice of a real achievement
97. 
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The prospectuses did allow depositing goods at the bank as an alternative to land, but 
the bank could not stand on goods alone. First, there were not enough goods during that 
recession. Second, the prospectuses relied on land first and goods later, both in terms of 
importance and chronologically. Perhaps goods could be used by some people some of 
the time, but the bank could not be based exclusively on goods, especially at the 
beginning. Third, the prospectuses mentioned the high risk of confiscation in a bank 
based on specie rather than land
98. This warning applied to goods as well. Under Andros 
it was unsafe to put so many goods in one place. He coveted not only every type of land 
the colonists had, but also half of the treasure from all shipwrecks
99 and their precious 
whale carcasses. Regularly cast on Plymouth shores, the whales’ oil was extremely 
valuable. Andros confiscated those cast on public land
100. There was also an idea to 
confiscate the specie of the missionary company (see Section 3)
101. The colonists 
believed that as long as they had any moveables – including “money, ships, goods, 
merchandizes” – Andros would keep using any “tricks, juggles, and designs” to seize 
them
102. Thus, goods could not support the bank. Without land, the bank was dead.   
  Of all the bank officers, nobody knew better than Blackwell the consequences of a 
constitutional change on property. He had gained a lot of land during the Civil War and 
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lost it with the Restoration
103. Adam Winthrop, cousin of the Winthrop councilors, was 
another bank officer. As a merchant in London in the 1670s he had seen the Stuart 
attitude to property rights. In particular, the Stop of the Exchequer was a collpase of a 
system built by his father’s cousin (Sir George Downing). Upon returning to 
Massachusetts in 1680 he was the only man who participated in all the money and credit 
ventures of the following decade
104. He may have convinced fellow bank officers that the 
Stuart-appointed Andros was not different from a Stuart tyrant.  
7. The Existing Explanations 
The mystery of the bank’s fall has intrigued scholars for generations. Some blame Andros 
for shutting down the bank because of Blackwell’s Cromwellian past, Blackwell’s 
opinion on devaluation, or the joining of the anti-England Cooke
105. However, 
Blackwell’s final letter indicates voluntary withdrawal of bank partners
106. There is no 
evidence that Andros forced anyone to withdraw or that he directly did anything to 
Blackwell or the bank. Also, all these issues were known at least a year before July 1688: 
Blackwell’s past was known already in 1686; as trade committee head, so was his view 
on devaluation (stated in the 1688 prospectus); Cooke joined in June 1687. The bank 
actually progressed during that last year.   
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104 He was a trustee in the clearinghouse, an officer in Blackwell’s bank, and a member in the government’s 
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  Bailyn (1955) claims that the bank failed for lack of support from the merchants, who 
preferred manipulation of the value of foreign coin. This is unlikely. First, the valuation 
of coin was decided against the merchants in March 1687.
107 Since then the recession 
became much worse, partly because of Andros’s other policies
108. Also, Bailyn falsely 
distinguishes merchants from landowners. He names merchants Wharton and Simon 
Lynde as leading the campaign on coin valuation, whereas both were Atherton partners 
and either they or their relatives had led the bank
109.  
  Others argue that Andros’s arrival invalidated the bank’s charter or that Dudley had no 
authority to charter the bank
110. As the prospectuses indicate, a charter was not necessary 
because it was a partnership, not a corporation. Anyway, the council probably did have 
the power of chartering
111. The prospectuses do not mention the legal tender status that 
had been given in 1686, so perhaps Andros cancelled it. Nevertheless, this would not 
have been a fatal flaw, but merely a step back to the original bank plan that Blackwell 
brought from England. In general, Council decisions under Dudley were still valid unless 
explicitly overruled by Andros or contradicted his commission
112. 
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8. Conclusion 
On Thursday, July 12
th, 1688, the recommissioned royal governor Sir Edmund Andros 
launched a surprising legal attack on a sample of important landowners. After reflecting 
on this during the weekend, on the following Monday some colonists gave up: a record 
number of landowners petitioned to have their land titles confirmed as required, and John 
Blackwell aborted his land bank. My hypothesis is consistent with expectations the 
colonists could have had while waiting for the Dominion, during Dudley’s reign, during 
Andros’s first year and a half in office, and after his direct attack on titles. It explains the 
timing of launching the bank scheme, its continuation in a difficult year, and its crash in 
July 1688. The explanation of the crash is backed by both qualitative data (Sewall’s diary 
and letters) and quantitative data (Figure 1).  
America’s first bank was one of the last victims of the Stuart tyranny. The cover of the 
book collecting Andros’s land warrants at the Massachusetts Archives describes him “a 
governor, and rascally petty tyrant, under the king and grand tyrant of Britain.” The 
colonists repeatedly referred to Andros’s government as a French one, the contemporary 
Louis XIV being the epitome of tyranny. His councilors testified that he “resolved and 
practiced to make all men’s titles quite null and void.” It happened gradually, as noted by 
famed historian Thomas Hutchinson: “property became every day more and more 
precarious
113.” The land policy eventually led to the 1689 revolution against Andros. 
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  The analogy with the Stuarts is justified. Bank directors and Councilors Dudley, 
Stoughton, and Wait Winthrop were powerless under Andros. The Council usually did 
not vote, and Andros ruled alone
114. The rise of the bank during Dudley’s reign is an 
example of absolutism supporting growth by expropriating the returns on investments 
that might not have arisen otherwise. The fall of the bank is an example of absolutism 
hampering private financial development. It did not take a revolution to change the 
bank’s fortunes, but just a new man at the top of the same absolutist government
115. 
While the removal of the Stuarts led to a banking boom in England, Blackwell’s bank 
was not revived after the Stuarts and Andros were deposed. This requires an explanation. 
Before Andros was deposed, Blackwell had gone to Pennsylvania as Governor. When he 
returned in 1690, Massachusetts was facing extreme political uncertainty and a war with 
Canada. Moreover, the Andros land policy was not overruled by the new king until late 
1691. Before conditions were ripe for another attempt at a bank, the colony issued its 
own paper money during an emergency in late 1690. From that point, all bank schemes – 
including a 1714 attempt to resurrect Blackwell’s bank – were suppressed by the 
government, which cherished its monopoly on paper money. The government was also 
too democratic to allow its leaders to personally expropriate profits as in Dudley’s reign. 
Instead of banks, with their quantity of money limited and soundly backed by land and 
goods, Massachusetts thus ended up with public paper money, spent or lent by 
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politicians, and not always properly backed
116. Eighteenth century Massachusetts might 
have enjoyed higher growth and lower inflation had Blackwell’s bank succeeded.  
  Development economics recognizes the difficulties of financial progress in countries 
where the rule of law is weak. A final lesson here is that the real story may be in a 
seemingly unrelated area. The (unintentional?) culprit in Massachusetts was the land 
policy – the biggest story of the Andros era – rather than any personal, monetary, or 
corporate issue, as claimed in the literature. 
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Table 1: Timeline of Events 
 
1684: Massachusetts charter revoked.  
May 1686: Dominion of New England established. Dudley is temporary President. 
June – September 1686: Bank promoted by government. 
December 1686: Governor Andros arrives. 
February – July 1687: New land policy revealed. 
March 1687: Andros decides on foreign coin valuation. 
April 1687: First sign of life from the bank under Andros. 
January 1688: Last sign of life from the bank. 
5 July 1688: Andros’s new commission arrives. 
12 July 1688: Writs of intrusion issued. 
16 July 1688: Bank aborted. 
December 1688: Blackwell leaves for Pennsylvania. 
1689: Andros deposed, provisional government joins war with France. 
March 1690: Blackwell returns, war intensifies. 
December 1690: Provisional government starts issuing paper money. 
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Figure 1: Land Petitions for Confirmations per Day, 01/01/1687 – 08/31/1688 
 
 
Source: Massachusetts Archives vol. 126-129. 
 Electronic versions of the papers are available at 
http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/working_papers.html 
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